Yi Hoegwang (1862–1933), a Korean Buddhist monk and leader, had come to Tokyo in October 1910 for an important meeting. He must have had a lot on his mind as he prepared to convene with the head priest of one of the most powerful Buddhist institutions in Japan, the Sōtōshū (Sōtō sect). Yi had been sent to draw up terms of an alliance between the Sōtōshū and the recently founded Wŏnjong (Consummate sect),¹ a new organization supported by Korean Buddhist leaders that sought to unify, revitalize, and modernize the enfeebled, impoverished Korean Buddhism. For the past three years, Yi’s own government, the Korean imperial government, as well as the Japanese Protectorate office, had turned away the Wŏnjong’s petitions for state recognition and legal protection. Now that Japanese colonial authorities controlled Korea, an alliance with the Sōtōshū, with its deep connections to the Meiji government, might provide the Wŏnjong with sufficient clout to get petitions approved.

On that same day, Yi’s Japanese colleague Takeda Hanshi (1863–1911), a Sōtō priest and the recent advisor to the Wŏnjong, was resting at a hospital in Seoul, fighting off cancer. Takeda was surely wondering how the meeting was going. He, like Yi, was firmly convinced that the Sōtōshū would be able to help the Wŏnjong receive state recognition and that the Wŏnjong, through the protection of the colonial government, could

¹. In Korean, the term *chong* (as a suffix, -jong) is equivalent to the Japanese *shū* (sect or school).
revitalize Korean Buddhism. But this was just one step in a larger plan: Takeda envisioned that a revitalized, modernized Korean Buddhism, with the guidance of the Sōtōshū, would push Christianity and Western imperial powers out of Asia. For both Takeda and the Wŏnjong, a lot rested on this meeting.

This was the scene on that autumn day, less than two months after Japan’s annexation of Korea, when the two sides met to hammer out terms for a mutually beneficial “alliance” (K. yŏnhap tongmaeng and Jp. rengō dōmei). The fact of the meeting and its aftermath has gone down in Korean history as a shameful moment when Korean Buddhists, torn between nationalism and collaboration, threw in the hat with their new colonial rulers. For decades following, historiography rendered this event as one of imperialist Japanese Buddhists seeking to colonize Korean Buddhism on behalf of the Meiji regime—a “religious annexation” that was an extension of the political annexation a few months prior. Even though a century has passed since the attempted alliance, the predominant narrative is still framed in political terms, such as colonial oppression versus nationalist resistance. Moreover, this one event in 1910 is made to represent all of the nearly seven-decade relationship between Korean and Japanese Buddhism in the modern period.

But in reality, this relationship and the Sōtō-Wŏnjong alliance involved a great deal more than political ideology. Driving decisions on both sides were sectarian competition among Japanese Buddhists, Pan-Asian Buddhist visions, the threat posed by Christianity, self-promotion, the need to secure temple properties as Korean society disintegrated, and the desire among Korean Buddhists to make use of Japanese Buddhist financial, social, political, and educational resources to advance themselves, their temples, and their fledging institution. New ideas about modernity, the centralization and bureaucratization of religion, and the propagation of the Buddhist religion through missionary work also framed the way many Korean and Japanese Buddhists thought about their future.

This book explores how these factors shaped the relationship between Korean and Japanese Buddhists from 1877 to 1912 to bring to light the agency and voices of Buddhists from these two countries, which have been overshadowed by highly dramatized and politicized narratives. The central argument is that the relationship should be understood as one that
abounded with converging and diverging visions, interests, and strategies among Korean Buddhists, Japanese Buddhists, and the state regarding the future of Korean and Japanese Buddhism in the colony and the empire.

**Defining the Period and Historiography**

Recovering the richness of this history begins by defining the period and reviewing the nationalist/anti-colonialist historiography. Japanese Buddhist priests\(^2\) began missionary work in Korea decades before Japan fully colonized Korea in 1910. Soon after Japan forcibly opened Korea through gunboat diplomacy in 1876, Japanese priests established small temples and preaching halls in Korean port cities to support Japanese residents and their families. As Japan escalated its political involvement in Korea over the following years, especially after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905, so too did Japanese Buddhist priests seek to expand their control over the religious sphere of Korea, first targeting Korean temples and monastics as potential converts to their own sects. When Japan made Korea a protectorate in 1905, even greater numbers of Japanese Buddhists arrived in Korea, becoming more deeply involved with Korean Buddhism. The relationship between Japanese priests and Korean monks in these years was highly dynamic as individuals, groups, and institutions jockeyed to take control of the religious landscape during a time of tremendous social and political upheaval.

However, the relationship changed entirely when Japan made Korea its colony in 1910 and the Japanese colonial government took full control

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\(^2\) The term “priest” will be used in reference to a member of the Japanese monastic community and the term “monk” for a member of the Korean monastic community. The major difference between the two terms, broadly speaking, is with regard to the issue of celibacy. Even though by the early 1910s there were Korean monks who had families, the normative expectation was that Korean monks should be celibate. In Japan, however, celibacy had been disestablished at the beginning of the Meiji period as a part of the decriminalization policy promulgated by the government in 1871. Still, applying “monk” to Koreans and “priest” to Japanese is somewhat arbitrary because some of the Japanese sects felt ambivalent about the Meiji non-celibacy policy. In addition, the term “monk” means to be inclusive of both male and female ordained members, unless otherwise noted.
of all affairs in Korea. Through the promulgation of the Temple Ordinance of 1911, the government deliberately sidelined Japanese Buddhist missionaries and began regulating Korean Buddhism directly. The government firmly enforced the regulations of the Ordinance by mid-1912, effectively severing institutional contact between the two Buddhisms. Although Japanese Buddhist priests continued to work in Korea until 1945, when Japan lost the war and its colonies, Korean and Japanese Buddhists looked after their two communities separately.

This book takes up the relationship between Korean and Japanese Buddhism from 1877, when Okumura Enshin (1843–1913) opened the first Japanese temple in Pusan, to mid-1912, when enforcement of the 1911 Temple Ordinance segregated the two Buddhisms. This 35-year period is especially vibrant and rich because the Meiji government encouraged but did not control Japanese Buddhism tightly and because the rapidly disintegrating Korean government had even less oversight of Korean Buddhism, leading to a dynamic and creative relationship that had not been seen before nor has it been repeated since.

However, this unique and fascinating piece of history is not fully understood. Due to the scope and severity of Japan’s domination of Korea and the bitterness of Korea’s colonial experience, both Korean and Japanese scholars tend to render Japanese Buddhist missionaries as imperialists, working entirely on behalf of their government to achieve a political agenda. This view is not without merit: Japanese Buddhist priests in the late nineteenth century often came to Korea as chaplains during the 1895 Sino-Japanese war and the 1904 Russo-Japanese War, and as soldiers in the early 1940s. Buddhist leaders at home urged their priests to join Japan’s total war effort and trumpeted theological justifications for Japan’s superiority and domination of the colonized. In scholarship, Japanese Buddhism’s heightened role in Japan’s imperial conquests in the late 1930s and 1940s is mistakenly used as a lens to interpret the thought and behavior of Japanese priests in the pre-annexation period. As a result, the story of Buddhism in pre-colonial and early colonial Korea is inevitably cast almost entirely in political terms.

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3. For a detailed discussion of Japanese priests’ role in Japan’s war efforts, see Victoria, *Zen at War* and *Zen War Stories*, and Ives, *Imperial-Way Zen*. 
Scholars from Japan and Korea have produced ample histories since the 1960s. Two of the founding Japanese-language scholars of this topic were Nakano Kyōtoku and Han Sōkhūi. Their versions of the period later influenced scholars in the 1980s and 1990s, such as Mitō Ryō and Hishiki Masaharu. In Korea, Chŏng Kwangho, Sŏ Kyŏngsu, and Im Hyeubong wrote accounts in the 1970s and 1980s, which were drawn upon by Kim Kwangsik, Ch’oe Pyŏnghŏn, Kim Sunsok, and others in the 1990s and early 2000s. These Korean and Japanese scholars have brought to light the ways in which Japanese Buddhists perpetrated imperialist schemes in Korea and the responses of Korean monastics. Generally, these scholars have adhered to the narrative outlined in the following paragraphs.

By the late 1800s, modern changes had begun to dawn on Korean Buddhism as a result of the proactive reforms policies initiated by the Korean government (1897–1910) and work spearheaded by lay and monastic leaders. But this natural evolution toward modern practices was hijacked by the “invasion” of Japanese Buddhist priests, the “vanguard for Japan’s invasion of Korea.” Japanese priests from different sects forced Korean temples to pledge allegiance to Japanese Buddhism and imposed their own colonial, sectarian visions on Korean Buddhists. Later, the Japanese colonial government forced Korean monks to get married, thereby displacing Korean Buddhism’s agency.

The Korean monastics who cooperated with Japanese priests were “collaborators” and “anti-nationalists,” and therefore they were “traitors.” Some collaborators lacked “nationalist consciousness” and were “unaware of the true intention of Japanese Buddhist sects.” Those who resisted the Japanese were nationalists who defended the Korean nation and the

4. Their representative works are Nakano, *Tennōsei kokka to shokuminchi dendo*; and Han, *Nihon no Chōsen shihai to shikyō seisaku*.
7. Han, *Nihon no Chōsen shihai,* 15; and Ch’oe Pyŏnghŏn, “Ilche ŭi ch’imnyak kwa Pulgyo,” 94.
Korean Buddhist tradition, and therefore they were heroes. Those Korean monastics who neither collaborated nor resisted were “defenseless”\textsuperscript{10} and gullible victims. Japanese priests, for their part, worked inseparably with the government “in line with Japan’s goals of invasion and control of the colonized”\textsuperscript{11} and were solely interested in making Koreans “faithful subjects of the emperor” (kōminka).\textsuperscript{12} If Japanese Buddhists could bring Korean Buddhism under their control, this would further strengthen the Japanese government’s colonization of Korea as a whole. Japanese Buddhist missionaries were nothing more than “state officials.” Their work in Korea was “not a Buddhist propagation” effort and therefore there is “nothing to be positively evaluated”\textsuperscript{13} in the impact they made. In a word, there were no religious contributions, at either an individual or social level, to Korea whatsoever.\textsuperscript{14}

Japanese Buddhism’s attempt to subjugate Korean Buddhism started in the late 1870s. The Higashi Hongan-ji-\textsuperscript{ha}\textsuperscript{15} of the Jōdoshinshū (Jōdo sect) was the first to act on its interest in Korean Buddhism, followed by the Nichirenshū (Nichiren sect), the Jōdoshū (Jōdo sect), the Honpa Hongan-ji-\textsuperscript{ha} of the Jōdoshinshū, and the Sōtōshū. It culminated in the infamous Sōtō-Wŏnjong merger of 1910. The Sōtōshū colluded with the governing body of Korean Buddhism, the Wŏnjong, to form an agreement that the Wŏnjong would be converted to and thus controlled by the Sōtōshū, thereby eradicating the institutional identity of the Wŏnjong. This merger was arranged by one of Japan’s most notorious imperialists, Takeda Hanshi, forty-six days after Japan’s annexation of Korea in late August. The head of the Wŏnjong, the Korean monk Yi Hoegwang, almost succeeded in handing Korean Buddhism over to Japan for his own profit and advancement. Yi was “extremely pro-Japanese” and “a seller of Korean Buddhism.”\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Sō Kyōnsu, “Ilche ī Pulgyo chŏngch’aek,” 5.
\item Hishiki Masaharu, “Tōzai Honganji kyōdan no shokuminchi fukyō,” 157–75.
\item Nakano, Tennōsei kokka; and Mitō Ryō, “Shinshū no Chōsen fukyō,” 51–72.
\item Hishiki, “Tōzai Honganji kyōdan,” 157–75.
\item Mitō, “Chōsen fukyō no ronri,” 108; and “Shinshū no Chōsen fukyō,” 51–72.
\item Ha here means branch.
\item Im, Ch’inni sŭngnyŏ 108-in, 48–53.
\end{enumerate}
The merger was blocked, however, thanks to “monks with a nationalist consciousness”\(^\text{17}\) who established a counter sect, the Imjejong. The Imjejong fought to retain Korean Buddhism’s identity. However, the colonial government thwarted this indigenous, heroic, nationalist movement by issuing the 1911 Temple Ordinance and ordering the Imjejong to disband. Korean Buddhist monastics succumbed to the repressiveness of colonial rule throughout the remaining colonial period and became its tool. The 1911 Temple Ordinance was nothing more than “the persecution of Buddhism.”\(^\text{18}\) Thus, Japanese Buddhist missionaries faithfully sowed the seeds of conquest so that the colonial government could harvest Korean Buddhism later. The scheme was well laid out on this political trajectory.

This politicized narrative undoubtedly is a dominant, legitimate way of viewing the given history in the process of the ongoing decolonization in post-colonial Korea and Korean Buddhism. Nevertheless, it has been the single, orthodox version of the history preventing the formation of different points of view. Even though more than a century has passed since the 1910 Sōtō-Wŏnjong alliance, scholarship continues to interpret the event with nationalist undertones, as Carter Eckert has pointed out about colonial Korean historiography in general, such narratives continue “to exalt the nation and subordinate all scholarly inquiry to that purpose.”\(^\text{19}\) As a result, this historiography fails to provide sufficient attention to the true intricacy of the first three-and-a-half decade relationship between Korean and Japanese Buddhists, thereby greatly underestimating the agency of individuals and institutions on both sides.

**New Interpretive Frameworks**

Over the last ten years, scholars of East Asian colonial history have begun examining the limitations of constructing history in primarily political terms. For example, contemporary scholars of Korean and Japanese modern history have successfully established that, although there is

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\(^\text{17}\) Kim Sunsŏk, “Kūndae Pulgyo chongdan,” 89; and “Kūndae Ilbon Pulgyo saeryŏk,” 65.

\(^\text{18}\) Chŏng Kwangho, “Ilche ch’imnyak sigi ūi pŏmnan sanghwang” (1994).

no question that the Japanese colonial government advanced colonialism by the use of brute force, it is also true that the Japanese colonial government, like many modern nation-states, had to maintain control by providing incentives and working cooperatively with its subjects. Thus, policies were constantly adjusted to persuade and assimilate the colonized. This point suggests that colonial relationships are not entirely defined by binaries. For example, the binary of Koreans as only either victims or resistors breaks down upon examination of how Koreans actively participated in the colonial system for their own ends.

These suggestions, among others, have given rise to three new interpretive frameworks of colonial Korean history: colonial modernity, cultural nationalism, and internationally centered historiography. The concept of colonial modernity posits that aspects of modernity did emerge in Korea, albeit in the context of colonialism, and that Koreans benefited significantly from it. Likewise, as recent scholars of colonial Korean Buddhism have pointed out, the Korean Buddhist sangha underwent modern changes, which were not necessarily negative, during the colonial period. As for the concept of cultural nationalism, Kenneth Wells challenges the modernist approach to nationalism, which he feels marginalizes the influence of religion. He asserts that Christianity and Korean modern nationalism were inseparable. A parallel entwining of religion and nationalism is seen in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Korean Buddhism: Korean Buddhist monastics set forth a “Buddhist cultural nationalism” that prioritized the revitalization of Buddhism as the best way to preserve the national and cultural identity of Korea. This cultural nationalism emerged during the time that Korean Buddhists had the greatest contact with Japanese Buddhists. Scholars have also proposed the concept of internationally centered historiography. It criticizes the top-down and metro-centric approach that colonial history is subordinate to the main narratives of Japanese imperial history. In Korea Between Empires, Schmid has highlighted how Koreans, with the help of print

20. Myers and Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire; Eckert, Offspring of Empire; Barlow, Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia; Shin and Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea; Park, Colonial Industrialization; and Hwang, Beyond Birth.


22. Schmid, Korea Between Empires; and Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea.
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capitalism, joined global ideologies, created self-identities, and vied with colonial authorities and Japanese nationalists to represent and define discursive cultural terms.\textsuperscript{23} Likewise, pre-colonial Korean Buddhism needs to be understood in the global context in general and in the East Asian framework in particular. The survival tactics of Buddhist monasteries in Taiwan, China, and Korea through alliances with the Japanese had roots in the way their own governments had marginalized them\textsuperscript{24}: comparing the relationship of each Buddhism to its state provides context for understanding how Korean Buddhism responded to modernity, colonialism, and nationalism.

Recent Revisions Drawing on New Frameworks

Just as scholars of East Asian colonial history are proposing new interpretive frameworks, historians of Japanese and Korean colonial Buddhism are working out new methodologies. For example, Japanese-language scholarship has recently offered useful guidance on rewriting the history of Japanese missionary work in Asia. They have proposed that scholars pursue “multi-layered and multi-contested approaches” to go beyond the two sentiments of “guilt” versus “hatred”\textsuperscript{25}—sentiments dominant particularly in the scholarship of Korean and Japanese scholars. They have also stressed the meticulous incorporation of primary sources beyond sectarian and national lines.\textsuperscript{26} Likewise, scholars of Korean Buddhism in Korea are questioning the pro-Japanese (\textit{ch’inil})/anti-Japanese (\textit{hang’il}) paradigm. For example, they argue that scholarship should incorporate not “presentist views,” which look at the past through the contemporary eyes of the scholar, but “internal approaches,” which

\textsuperscript{23} Schmid, \textit{Korea Between Empires}, 4–5.

\textsuperscript{24} Prasenjit Duara (\textit{Sovereignty and Authenticity}) discusses how religious traditions in Manchuria delegitimized by the Chinese government collaborated with Manchuko, a Japan puppet government that worked to make these marginalized religions into an integral part of Manchuko nationality. In the case of Taiwan, Leo Ching (\textit{Becoming \textit{Japanese}}) points out how the earlier relationship between China and Taiwan is crucial to understanding Taiwan’s active participation in Japanese colonialism.

\textsuperscript{25} Kiba and Kojima, \textit{Ajia no kaikyō to kyōiku}, 8.

\textsuperscript{26} Fujii, “Senzen nī okeru Bukkyō,” 8–22; Sueki, “Tokushū nī attatte,” 6; and \textit{Kin-dai Nihon no shisō saikō}, 245.
understand the past from the perspectives of those who lived it. They further recommend evaluating Korean Buddhist history not from a “nationalist perspective” but from “the view of religious history.” They suggest that binaries obstruct a comprehensive analysis of Korean Buddhists’ responses to colonialism broadly and to Japanese Buddhism specifically. While there is now a clear call from both to revise the history of colonial Buddhism through a balanced use of sources and using new interpretive frameworks, there are as yet few extensive writings on the topic in point.

However, English-language scholars have begun to contribute revisions on the history of colonial Buddhism. They have been the most vocal about challenging the binary, nationalist paradigm by highlighting the complexity of the interactions between Japanese and Korean

29. To name a few: Kim Kwangsik, “Kŭndae Pulgyosa yŏng’gu”; Cho Sŏngt’aek, “Kŭndae Pulgyohak kwa Han’guk kŭndae Pulgyo”; Pak Noja (aka Vladimir Tikhonov), “Han’guk kŭndae minjokchu’i wa Pulgyo”; Ch’oe Hyegyŏng, “Ilche ŭi Pulgyo chŏngch’ak”; and Han Sanggil, “Kaehwa ki Ilbon Pulgyo.”
30. Japanese scholars have recently produced a number of works primarily focusing on the relationship between Japanese and Chinese (including Manchurian and Taiwanese) Buddhism and on the missionary work of Japanese Buddhism in the West (for example, the six volumes of the collections of materials on missionary work to North and South America [Bukkyō kaigai kaikyō shi shiryō shūsei]). Most recently, Kawase Takaya has published a book titled Shokuminchi Chōsen no shūkyō to gakuchi: Teikoku Nihon no manazashi no kōchiku in which he examines the relationship between religious policies and scholarship in colonial Korea. The book includes two chapters on Buddhism. However, there is no comprehensive, book-length study on the Korean-Japanese colonial Buddhist relationship. Still, there are three edited books by a number of Korean scholars that have made an effort to see Korean Buddhism during the pre-colonial and colonial periods in an international context and beyond binaries. These are Pulgyo kŭndaehwa ŭi chŏngae wa sŏnkyŏk by the Chogye order, and Kŭndae Tong Asia ŭi Pulgyohak and Tong Asia Pulgyo kŭndae wa ŭi mannam by Tongguk University. Yet, while these works are a welcome revision of the conventional scholarship and an addition to the growing voices of new approaches among scholars, these books tend to cover the entire period from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century in a rather cursory and fragmented way. Moreover, in the discussion of the 1877–1910 period, the articles in these books focus on the Korean side and draw primarily from Korean sources.
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Buddhism. For example, an article by Henrik Sørenson concludes that Japanese Buddhist missionaries played “a very important role in the Korean Buddhist renaissance.” Vladimir Tikhonov also argues that to Korean monks Japan was viewed “as their protector in practice and an ideal of Buddhism-friendly modernity in theory.” Most recently, Pori Park and Jin Park have further contributed to the complexities surrounding the reform movements and intellectual developments of colonial Korean Buddhism in the East Asian and global context.

Likewise, this book seeks to significantly revise this period but differs from the approach of other current scholars in three ways. First, even though scholars universally mark the paradigm shift in the relationship between the two Buddhasms at 1910, with the annexation of Korea, it is better to look toward mid-1912. The peak of each side attempting to find affiliations and alliances did not end with annexation but further intensified until mid-1912, at which point the colonial government actively enforced the Temple Ordinance of 1911. This roughly two-year period following annexation was in fact one of the most dynamic in the relationship between Japanese and Korean Buddhism. For example, the consequences of the Sōtō-Wŏnjong agreement, formed two months after annexation, played out in significant ways in the following year and a half, involving multiple parties and individuals beyond the original delegates to the meeting.

Second, contemporary revisions still tend to rely on primary sources from one sect exclusively. This book takes a more comprehensive and balanced approach on the work of the Japanese Buddhist sects active in Korea by drawing from the denominational journals of five sects.


34. Pori Park, Trial and Error in Modernist Reforms.

35. Y. Jin Park, Makers of Modern Korean Buddhism.
Evidence is provided to show that sectarian rivalry contributed to the unfolding of key events, such as the promulgation of regulations from the state, tensions among Buddhists and officials from both countries, and to the split in Korean Buddhism in 1911.

Third, and most importantly, this book questions and revises the near-universal assumption that the Sōtō-Wŏnjong agreement was a merger—a “religious annexation”—that would have led to the Sōtōshū absorbing the Wŏnjong. A careful reexamination of the major key players, events, and writings surrounding the Sōtō-Wŏnjong agreement suggests that there also existed contentious visions and strategies among Takeda, the Sōtōshū, and Yi regarding Korean Buddhism. Takeda’s work for Korean Buddhism receives extensive attention because historiography’s immutable image of Takeda as an ultra-nationalist predetermines the responses of Korean monks. Adding to the complexity of Takeda’s role as a Sōtōshū missionary changes how the Sōtō-Wŏnjong alliance is understood and provides more room for the potential agency of the Korean monks with whom he worked. In revising the Sōtō-Wŏnjong alliance, this book also brings to light a key figure, Kim Yŏnggi (1877–?), whom historiography has failed to notice. From early on, Kim was deeply involved in the Wŏnjong’s cause, mediating between Takeda and Yi, and the Sōtōshū and the Wŏnjong. The incorporation of Kim significantly changes the conventional understanding of the Wŏnjong movement and the 1910 alliance.

**The Scope of This Book**

With these points in mind, among others, this book seeks to provide a thorough revision and comprehensive understanding of the history of the relationship between Korean and Japanese Buddhism from the late nineteenth century to mid-1912. The first chapter revisits the backgrounds of late Chosŏn and Meiji Buddhism, contrasts the circumstances in which Korean and Japanese Buddhists found themselves in the late nineteenth century, and highlights the newly available opportunities to both. The second chapter begins with a discussion of the academic debate on the discourse of propagation (*fukyō*) in modern Japanese Buddhism,36

36. *Fukyō* can be translated into English also as either proselytization or mission. However, throughout this book, *fukyō* will be used interchangeably with *propagation.*
followed by an outline of the beginnings of the Japanese Buddhist missionary efforts abroad. To provide the reader with a sense of the vibrancy and complexity of these early encounters, this chapter takes a close look at three Japanese priests—Okumura Enshin, Katō Bunkyō, and Shaku Unshō (1827–1909)—and their meetings with Korean monastics. Since neither side spoke each other’s language, these clerics communicated through written Chinese, which thus recorded “conversations” beautifully. These writings reveal how religious, national, and cultural identities were mutually shared, debated, and transformed.

Chapter 3 examines sectarian interests, one among several motivations, as an important force driving Japanese Buddhism. The Higashi Honganji (Shinshū Ōtani-ha), Nichirenshū, Jōdoshū, and Nishi Honganji (Shinshū Honganji-ha), especially, were in competition with each other to control as much, if not all, of Korean Buddhism as possible. Special attention will be given to how Japanese Buddhist missionaries exerted significant influence on Buddhists and high government officials in Korea, thus changing the landscape of Korean Buddhism. The following chapter analyzes the responses of Korean monks, the Korean government, and the Resident-General’s Office to Japanese Buddhist missionaries’ aggressive attempts to take over Korean Buddhism. It explores the growing number of alliances between the two Buddhisms. The state authorities became concerned, causing the Korean government to issue the Temple Ordinance of 1902 and the Resident-General’s Office to issue Regulations on Propagation of Religion in 1906. Special attention is given to how Korean monks made use of their alliances with Japanese sects, especially, as a way to share international terms, promote educational programs for monastics, and centralize their tradition through a new religious identity, signs that Korean Buddhism was beginning its modern transformation.

The emergence of the Sōtōshū in Korea in 1908 is taken up in the fifth chapter, with special attention to Takeda’s relationships with the Korean Buddhist Wōnjong, the Sōtōshū, and the state authorities. This chapter contends that Takeda’s persistent efforts to revitalize Korean Buddhism should shift scholars’ understanding of Takeda as merely a political figure. His religious interests as a Buddhist and as a Sōtō monk were as strong as his political commitments. Chapter 6 closely examines the complexities surrounding the Sōtō-Wōnjong-attempted alliance in 1910.
The chapter contends three points at odds with historiography. First, the alliance was not a religious annexation but a result of Yi’s calculated plan to make use of Takeda and the Sōtōshū to advance the interests of the Wŏnjong. To prove this point further, the terms of the Sōtō-Wŏnjong agreement are analyzed in relation to the 1910 treaty formalizing Japan’s full annexation of Korea. Second, behind this alliance deal was a Korean monk named Kim Yŏnggi, who played a crucial role as a mediator and informer between the two sects and between Takeda and Yi. Third, Takeda’s vision for Korean Buddhism was neither congruent with the colonial government’s nor with his own sect’s: the Sōtō administrators were reluctant to ally with Korean Buddhism. These findings do not alter the facts of the history of this event, but they do begin to complicate bipolar interpretations of it.

Desperate to see the alliance through, Takeda, despite failing health, wrote a treatise to persuade unenthusiastic parties. Chapter 7 looks at his book *Treatise on the Six Truths for the Wŏnjong (Enshū rokutai ron)*, the most detailed vision statement among those written by Japanese Buddhist missionaries on the revitalization of Korean Buddhism. The chapter goes on to examine why Takeda was unable to conclude the agreement before his death in mid-1911: Wŏnjong monks had multiple affiliations and were playing off the Japanese sects. The first governor-general, Teruuchi Masatake (1857–1919), was completing the Temple Ordinance; and the Sōtōshū did not follow through. A detailed history of the ramifications of the 1911 Ordinance, including the events of the chaotic year and a half following its promulgation, concludes the chapter.

The conclusion brings together points from the proceeding chapters to make larger observations about the impact of Japanese sectarianism, the agency of Korean monks, the modern transformation of Korean Buddhism, and Japanese Buddhism’s efforts in propagation. The postscript briefly looks at how the 1911 Temple Ordinance inadvertently led to the clarification and strengthening of Korean Buddhism’s identity in the remainder of the colonial period.

**Arguments**

The chapters, taken together, argue for several broad points that have, to one degree or another and with varying amounts of evidence, been made
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by other scholars but which have not been brought together into one, comprehensive narrative. As for Japanese Buddhists, one of the most significant factors at play was sectarian competition within Japanese Buddhism. Each sect’s desire to bring Korean Buddhism under its own wing caused sects to work against each other and even against the needs of their own state. This rivalry led to such discord that the protectorate and colonial governments felt compelled to step in. Equally important to understanding the period is the Japanese Buddhist zeal for propagation, a discourse newly introduced through the Christian missionaries in East Asia. The term fūkyō or dendō (propagation) was one of the most frequently used ideological terms deployed among Japanese Buddhists to justify expanding sectarian teachings and institutional influence in Japan and abroad. For the first time in its history, Japanese Buddhist sects operated transnationally. Many Japanese Buddhists envisioned a Pan-Asian Buddhism that, led by a particular sect, would help Asia retain its culture in the face of Western imperialism. Korean Buddhism would be an integral part of this unified, global Buddhism.

This Pan-Asian Buddhism would also act to counter the advances of Christianity into East Asia, a concern shared by both Japanese and Korean Buddhists and one that, in part, brought the two sides together. Many of the writings of Buddhists in this period refer to Christianity, indicating that Christianity was serving as an important point of reference to reconfiguring Korean and Japanese Buddhists’ personal and institutional identity. Finally, in terms of extra-political factors shaping the history of this period, individual priests were motivated to advance their own interests. Whatever lackluster standing one might have in Japan, working in Korea automatically boosted an individual’s prestige and clout, since both the Korean and Japanese states considered Japanese Buddhists useful. Japanese Buddhists often took this opportunity to gain fame so that they could receive higher positions within their own sect.

As for the Korean side, the most important factor that caused Korean Buddhists to work with Japanese Buddhists was the need to ensure the safety and protection of their temples. As law and order broke down in Korea, temples were raided and occupied not just by Korean officials—anti-Japanese soldiers—but also by Japanese soldiers. Korean Buddhists also had social mobility in mind. As members of a marginalized group, Korean monks turned to influential Japanese Buddhists to make contact

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with the state and to advance various projects. Furthermore, Korean monastics, and especially elite monks, prioritized returning Korean Buddhism to the center of the capital city, to which it had been denied official access for centuries. Lacking the right political connections and institutional backing, they turned to well-connected Japanese Buddhist sects. Also, many Korean Buddhists considered Japanese Buddhism as a model—and for many it was the only model—of a successfully reformed and modernized version of Buddhism. They sought to recreate that for Korean Buddhism, taking on new projects in education, propagation, and institutionalization. Lastly, just as was true for Japanese Buddhist missionaries, individual monastics pursued their own personal agendas, gains, and fame in the name of reform, modernization, and the nation.

For both Japanese and Korean Buddhists, their relationship to state authorities was far more complicated than simply that of becoming cogs in political machines. In the pre-colonial period, the state had less control over the actions of either side than it did during the colonial years. As a result, in relation to the state and in relation to each other, Japanese and Korean Buddhists had considerable latitude in making decisions that were in their own best interests. This degree of agency will be made evident in the new narrative history this book sets forth.

All of these factors, in addition to an awareness of political ideology, had a tremendous impact on how Buddhists from the two countries acted, how they saw themselves, and how they used various discourses to achieve their aims. Which factor superseded others was contingent upon complex social, political, and economic situations in Korea, Japan, and the rest of the world.

**Theoretical Perspective**

The central argument of this book—that Korean and Japanese Buddhists were able to exert their own interests, visions, and strategies in the context of national, colonial, and modern forces—is based on theoretical frameworks proposed by a number of post-colonial and cultural studies scholars. In examining Orientalism as it relates to the Buddhist religion specifically, Charles Hallisey criticizes Edwards Said’s definition by arguing that the relationship between the colonizer and colonized, between the West and the non-West, was not as one-dimensional as Said
would have it. Rather, the relationship was based on a “transcultural mimesis” in which the colonized actively participated in the construction of the images of their tradition and religion. For example, European Orientalist Rhys Davids (1843–1922) had to hire local people, who presented their own religion as they wanted it to appear, something Davids could not control.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, the colonized did not just determine their own representation but also configured the representation of the colonizer. Mary Louise Pratt goes so far as to argue that the entity of Europe was created not only by Europeans but also by their colonies.\textsuperscript{38} Because of their racial, cultural, and historical commonality, the mimesis between Korean and Japanese Buddhists, especially in the colonial setting, was intensified, with each side continuously reinforcing—like two mirrors facing each other—religious, cultural, and national identities.\textsuperscript{39} These new theoretical frameworks help recover the overlooked creativity and agency of Korean and Japanese Buddhism in the zones of cultural contact.

The emphasis on agency in this revised history is informed by Pierre Bourdieu’s elaboration of Weber and Foucault’s theories of discourse and power-relations. In particular, this study draws on Bourdieu’s sociological terminology of \textit{habitus}, \textit{capital}, and \textit{field} as tools to better understand how social agents, namely Korean and Japanese Buddhist clergy, endowed with different dispositions (\textit{habitus}), enter into the games of struggles for power and dominance in diverse fields or spaces (political, economic, religious, and others) with the capital or influence (economic, political, and symbolic) available to them.\textsuperscript{40} What makes Bourdieu’s sociological concepts useful in explaining human relationships and decision making is his determination to overcome the binary mode of structure (objectivism) and action (subjectivism).\textsuperscript{41} Though it may seem impossible for social actors to overcome the structures of capital, field,
and habitus, for Bourdieu these constructions are not unchangeable. In making decisions, agents use the logic of practical strategies that accompany the altering of their activities in response to shifts of the social, religious, and political structures (in other words, the shifts of fields and their positions in these fields). He argues that this logic opens “more or less wide spaces of possibilities.”\(^{42}\) This does not mean that agents can be emancipated from all social structures, free of power-relations and personal dispositions. Rather, the central assertion of Bourdieu’s theory is that agents possess both the propensity (objectivism) and the aptitude to enter into the game with relative autonomy, and to play it with more or less success (subjectivism).

Bourdieu points out that religious leaders have a greater degree of agency than other social actors because they possess particularly significant symbolic capital. This capital is amply supported by doctrines that enable religious leaders to hold a monopoly on the matter of salvation and other spiritual issues. He argues that they are experts in “euphemization” who, using “religious language,” present their actions as purely spiritual and thus disconnected to potential personal and institutional profit. He goes so far as to maintain that religious leaders are unaware of their true, underlying intentions and reproduce this “misrecognition” in the complex field of human interactions.\(^{43}\) In such a way, Korean and Japanese Buddhists deftly, though perhaps unconsciously, utilized symbolic, universalistic language, rituals, and representations to garner support from the court, officials, people, and each other.

Although Bourdieu’s theory does not explain the whole context of the intricate, unique interplay between Korean and Japanese Buddhists,\(^{44}\) it

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44. Influenced by Max Weber’s sociology of religion, Bourdieu’s understanding of religion (or the religious field and its function) centers on the symbiotic and contentious relationships among prophets, priests, and the laity, or between religion (especially Catholicism) and the state. However, he does not give much attention to the religious field in the *colonial* context (although his sociological concepts were first formulated through his ethnographical research in Algeria, a colony of France at the time, colonialism was not one of his primary subjects of interest), not to mention the religious field played by two non-Western religions from countries that share the same ethnic and religious identity. For his analysis of religion and the religious field, see
is still useful to understanding what kinds of capital and habitus Japanese and Korean Buddhists had as they played the field of Korea. Applying Bourdieu's concepts draws out the way in which the shifts in Korea of the religious field (the growing popularity of Christianity and new religions) and the political field (the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, Korea becoming Japan's protectorate, and annexation) compelled Korean Buddhists to incorporate diverse strategies to maximize their chance of winning. It also brings to light how, in their relationship with each other and with different visions and expectations, Buddhists from each side adjusted themselves to, altered, and transformed their given structures, fields, and capital. Bourdieu's concepts help reveal, in times of crisis or shifts of field, what kinds of capital were available to Korean and Japanese Buddhist communities in dealing with state authorities, and how they used their resources and euphemisms to legitimate and impose their own visions of Buddhism on each other.

Thus, Bourdieu’s construction, albeit limited, is instrumental in fleshing out the way Korean and Japanese Buddhists’ interests converged, diverged and reinforced each other. This examination will disrupt, first and foremost, the monolithic structures of imperialism, nationalism, and colonialism as the primary mode of knowledge and decision making (which themselves take on the dichotomy of subjectivism and objectivism\(^4^5\)) and thereby help recover the multiple voices and agendas of Korean and Japanese Buddhists.

As implied by Bourdieu with respect to religious leaders, this book explores Buddhist sangha members’ thoughts and behavior with the assumption that, as Robert Buswell has noted in his discussion of Korean monks, “monks are, in short, perfectly ordinary people” with “their

Bourdieu, “Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field,” 1–44; and Rey, Bourdieu on Religion.

\(^4^5\) For example, nationalism, as an inherent sentiment, has been the definitive mode for understanding a Korean’s response to the Japanese. It has been assumed that nationalist consciousness as the primordial experience of agents cannot be changed by any social, economic, and political structures. Nationalism as a monolithic structure has often been understood as the signifier of all Buddhists’ thoughts and behaviors in relation to Japan, overlooking the diversity and flexibility of their responses in practice to social and political structures. These approaches are exactly what Bourdieu strives to overcome.
virtues and their vices, their preferences and aversions.” Likewise, the monastery and sectarian institutions have had, again in Buswell’s words, “like any large social organization . . . varying interests and skills.”

This study applies the same understanding to Japanese priests and institutions.

By incorporating these theoretical frameworks to reveal the multiplicity of human interaction, this study is by no means intent on undermining the accomplishments of previous scholarship, which has unearthed Japanese Buddhism’s significant role in Japan’s oppressive colonialism and imperialism and Korean Buddhism’s patriotic responses. These have been important voices when Japan and Japanese Buddhist sects had not yet fully faced their past. Yet, current scholarship should pay equal attention to the diverse responses of both the Korean and Japanese sides. Therefore, by applying theoretical concepts, recent interpretative approaches and methodologies, this book seeks to present the first comprehensive study of the multifaceted relationship between Korean and Japanese Buddhists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Sources

Most of the writing in this book is based on primary sources comprising pre-colonial and colonial-era Buddhist publications from both Korea and Japan. Japanese scholars have largely overlooked Korean primary

47. Similarly, Davis points out that Meiji Buddhism changed its ideas and practice according to its institutional interests (Japanese Religion and Society, 181). Likewise, Garon suggests that Japanese Buddhist institutions behaved much like “interest groups” (Molding Japanese Minds, 68).
48. In 1980, the Sōtōshū published a history of its foreign missions, depicting that history positively and without admitting its contribution to Japan’s oppressive colonialism and imperialism. Faced with criticism, it soon retrieved all copies, and, in 1992, it apologized in a fifty-one-page report. See Sōtōshū kaigai kaikyō dendōhi and also Sōtōshū kaigai kaikyō dendōhi—kaishū ni tsuite. Although most Japanese Buddhist sects have expressed their apologies for the roles they played for Japanese imperialism and militarism during the first half of the twentieth century, there has not yet been a concerted effort to fully understand the implications of their past.
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...sources, while Korean academics have yet to fully integrate Japanese primary archives into their work.

On the Japanese side, I drew from the *Kyōgaku hōchi* newspaper (*shūhō*), which began in 1877 and, astonishingly, has been running continuously ever since. It is one of the oldest Buddhist newspapers in Japan (the name changed to *Chūgai nippō* in 1902). Although the articles were written from the perspective of the Higashi Honganji sect, the newspaper carried diverse perspectives and provides a comprehensive view of how Japanese Buddhists interacted with Korean and other Asian Buddhists. It also reported on the activities of Christian missionaries in China and Korea, revealing not only a lot about Christian missionary work itself but also how Japanese Buddhists felt about it. In addition, other denominational newspapers and journals—specifically, those published in Japan such as *Shinshū* (Ōtani Honganji), *Jōdo kyōhō* (Jōdo sect), *Nisshū shinpō* (Nichiren sect), *Kyōkai ichiran* (Honpa Honganji), and *Sōtōshū shūhō* (Sōtō sect)—and those published in colonial Korea such as *Chōsen Bukkyō*, *Kongō*, and *Shin’yū*), as well as personal letters, biographies, and diaries provide an insider’s look at the motivations and experiences of Japanese Buddhist missionaries in Korea. Takeda’s collected letters, diaries, and writings, on microfilm under the title *Kōchū iseki*, which include letters written by the key Wŏnjong figures, provide the basis for my biography of his Buddhist missionary work and for the Sōtō-Wŏnjong alliance. This book also takes up Takeda’s untranslated treatise *Enshū rokutai ron* (*The Treatise of the Sixth Truths for the Wŏnjong*).

On the Korean side, in addition to the two key compilations on Korean Buddhism—Yi Nŭnghwā’s *Comprehensive History of Korean Buddhism* (*Chosŏn Pulgyo tongsa*) and Takahashi Tōru’s *Korean Buddhism* (*Richŏ Bukkyŏ*)—I rely on a collection of sixty-nine volumes of Buddhist journals published from 1911 to 1945 (*Han’guk kŭn-hyŏndaegi Pulgyo charyo chŏnjip*). These journals are the most comprehensive of Korean Buddhist sources. Daily secular newspapers such as the *Hwangoŏng sinmun*, *Tongnip sinmun*, *Taehan maeil sinbo* (later *Maeil sinbo*), *Tonga ilbo*, and *Chosŏn...

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ilbo illuminate Korean Buddhism in the context of the broader history of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Korea, while also providing some direct reporting on Buddhist issues at the time. This book also draws on unpublished government documents in the Korean and Japanese languages, personal biographies and diaries, and temple documents. In places, English sources written and published by Western missionaries, travelers, and diplomats as they relate to Korean Buddhism serve as references. These materials provide ample perspective on the situation of Korean Buddhism and on local relationships between missionaries and Buddhist monks.

When examining a particular event, I have looked at what both the Korean and Japanese sources had to say about it. This parallel processing has provided fresh insight into how each side saw matters, and where views converged and diverged. However, my writing here does not capture the depth of what is revealed by these resuscitated sources, and I hope that scholars will return to these volumes to further their own writing.

While this book retains a focus on Korea exclusively, it is nonetheless useful in understanding the relationship between Japanese Buddhism and the Buddhisms of Taiwan, China, and other Asian countries. Of all the countries Japanese Buddhists performed missionary work in, their most dynamic and intertwined relationship was with Korean Buddhism. In this way, understanding the dimensions of the Japanese-Korean Buddhist relationship can create a framework for interpreting other relationships.

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50. A book-length work in English on the Japanese-Chinese Buddhist relationship in this period, based on a full and adequate reading of primary sources from both Japan and other parts of Asia, is missing. Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China; Sin-wai Chan, Buddhism in Late Ch’ing Political Thought; and Pittman, Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism briefly touch on the relationship between Chinese and Japanese Buddhists. In the three decades between the publication of these books, no other scholarship was published. However, Jones, Buddhism in Taiwan dedicates a third of the book to the influence of Japanese colonialism on Taiwanese Buddhism, and Xue Yu, Buddhism, War, and Nationalism discusses the relationship between Chinese Buddhists and the Japanese government in occupied China, rather than the work of Japanese Buddhist missionaries and their relationship with Chinese Buddhists.
The Question: Who Benefited More?

Just as we can complicate the historiography of this period by including multiple discourses, so too can the end result be understood in more complex terms. Many scholars have averred that Japanese Buddhism contributed nothing to the benefit of Korean Buddhism and, worse, did much to harm it. In this version of events, Korean Buddhists were powerless to stop the invasion of Japanese Buddhism. This conclusion makes sense from the point of view of a political agenda, in that Japanese Buddhists worked as the vanguards of Japan’s colonial expansion and were instrumental one way or another to Japan’s complete annexation of Korea in 1910. But when new interpretive frameworks are used, does this conclusion still stand? At the dusk of the pre-colonial period, and after thirty-five years of substantial contact, it is interesting to ask which side benefited more from the relationship: Korean Buddhism or Japanese Buddhism.