On July 12, 1899, at 4:30 pm, the offices of the *Moji shinbun* newspaper received an urgent telegram from Tokyo: an imperial edict had decreed that the twin ports of Moji and Shimonoseki (see Map 1), along with twenty other domestic ports, would soon open to international trade. The Meiji government timed these openings to coincide with the enactment of the watershed 1894 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, a long-awaited event that put an end to half a century of national humiliation by eliminating foreign rights of extraterritoriality and largely restoring tariff autonomy. Signaling the return of Japan’s sovereignty to the world at large, these twenty-two sites would become “open ports” (*kaikō* or *kaikōjō*) on a legal par with the soon-to-expire treaty ports.

Over the next three weeks, word of Japan’s anticipated opening hit newsstands around the globe. As the *New York Times* declared, “Changes in Rules Related to Foreigners Arouse Interest: Entire Country Open to

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1. *Moji shinbun*, July 13, 1899. Moji and Shimonoseki together are known as Kanmon. They are located on opposite shores of the Kanmon Strait, or Strait of Shimonoseki, which links the Inland Sea to the Korea Strait, opening to the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan.

2. The revised treaties took effect on July 17, 1899, exactly a year and a day after the July 16, 1894 signing. The celebrations, however, were delayed for more than two weeks. Although July 17 was to be the date that all new treaties were enacted, the treaty with France mistakenly used August 4 and Austria-Hungary followed suit, pushing the final date to August 4 (*Times*, July 17, 1899). As per the terms of revision, Japan would not regain full tariff autonomy until August 1911.
Introduction

All." The Times of London pronounced: “Japan takes [its] place today as an equal amongst the civilized Powers of the world.” And the Moji shinpō, true to its local interests, trumpeted “Treaties Enacted and Kanmon Opened” while chronicling the excitement and profound sense of achievement felt by residents in meeting the dual goals of revising the unequal treaties and opening their home ports. A special municipal council organized the festivities for Moji’s August 4 opening. Paper lanterns and national flags adorned doorways throughout the city as residents delighted in school ceremonies, banquets, live music, and fireworks at the city hall.

In addition to highlighting the merriment and auspiciousness of the occasion, the paper’s lead article asked readers to contemplate Japan’s

3. New York Times, July 26, 1899. “Open” in this context means that foreigners gained access to the interior of the country as opposed to being limited to the physically circumscribed treaty ports.
5. Ibid., August 1, 1899. Other cities with newly opened ports, including Hakata and Fushiki, held similar celebrations at the time (Fukuoka-shi Kōwanyoku, Hakata kōshi, 1–3, and Fushiki Kōshi Hensan Inkai, Fushiki kōshi, 316).
Introduction

history over the previous several decades. Since before the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese had suffered the great indignity of the unequal treaties as the Western powers had trampled Japan’s rights to self-governance while taking “refuge beneath a stronghold of consular courts.” Mojiites should be praised for their strenuous efforts in the national assembly—“writing until their brushes were worn and arguing until their voices were hoarse”—in winning this important milestone for their city. At the same time, there was hard work yet to be done and still higher aspirations to be met; this was but “the point of departure for the long-range plans of both ports” as they now embarked on their “natural” journey to become a center of international exchange in a free country.6

Despite the emphasis the Moji shinpō placed on this new beginning, 1899 does not, in fact, represent the start of the city’s foreign trade. Moji had been exporting coal overseas and providing bunker coal to domestic and foreign ships in its harbor for a decade when the 1899 edict declared it an open port. In this short period, its inhabitants—from entrepreneurs and shopkeepers to stevedores, sailors, politicians, and journalists—had already made a name for their city as a key national and international transportation hub.7 They had established commercial networks throughout East Asia and served on the front lines of Japan’s first war with China. Moreover, as the newspaper proudly declared, of the country’s twenty-two newly opened ports, Moji had enjoyed the top foreign trade earnings for the preceding two years. This rank was especially impressive since, unlike most of the others, it was authorized only to export goods.8 Now granted permission to import as well, Moji’s residents imagined a very bright future for their city.

Moji’s story, and others like it, are barely known within Japan today, much less outside it. The history of Meiji globalization is usually narrated in reference to the five treaty ports of Hakodate, Kobe (Hyōgo), Nagasaki, Niigata, and Yokohama and the two open cities (kaishi) of Osaka and Tokyo.9 Since the treaty ports became the physical

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7. With 30,000 residents, Moji had become large enough to be named a city just that April.
9. Tokyo and Osaka received designation as open cities distinguishing them from the treaty ports. Nonetheless, Osaka quickly began functioning as a foreign trade port whereas Tokyo would not become an international port until 1941. On
manifestation of informal empire in Japan during the almost half-century of their existence, from 1854 to 1899, they are natural locations from which to discuss the country’s international connections. Yet a framework that relies on the treaty ports alone misses the much more complex system of maritime relations that developed in East Asia during this pivotal era.

All but one of the ports that were “newly opened” in 1899 had already been functioning as restricted international trade ports prior to that year. Although some had only recently begun operations, over half had been handling foreign trade for a decade or more. Classified broadly as “special trading ports,” these sites already had, or were in the process of acquiring, the equipment necessary for modern global commerce: harbors capable of handling deep-draft steamships, lighthouses, storage sheds, loading docks, and more. All were administering customs and handling cargo as well as providing piloting services and connective land transportation. Some, including Moji, offered additional business opportunities as merchants sold wares and foodstuffs on smaller vessels in the offing and prostitutes found their way aboard foreign ships. In all these capacities, the special trading ports and their activities (legal or otherwise) operated under full Japanese jurisdiction.

The treaty port system looks very different with the inclusion of special trading ports. When the treaties ended in 1899, instead of six working international ports (including Osaka but not Tokyo), Japan had twenty-eight ports already appointed to handle overseas trade. The number rises to forty-one when we include the thirteen additional ports named in the recently acquired colonies of Taiwan and the Pescadores. Operating in the shadow of the treaty ports, the special trading ports proved to be a kind of foil to the overarching system, allowing Japan to establish its own foreign trade despite restrictions at the treaty ports. Still, the special trading ports and their role in building Japan’s empire were contingent on the multinational treaty port system that developed across East Asia in the mid-nineteenth century. It was only within this broader set of networks that Japan was able to expand its global interactions at the height of the imperial age while tethering these vital connections to

the opening and function of these ports and cities, see Ōyama, Kyōjōyakuka ni okeru. In using “globalization,” I mean a modern rather than postcolonial phase of this process, as A.G. Hopkins offers in his attempt to periodize this unwieldy term (Globalization in World History, 3–11).

10. The only exception was Taketoyo.
Introduction

numerous local sites along the archipelago’s shoreline and its growing periphery.

An examination of the special trading ports forces us to rethink Japan’s speedy path from semicolonony to empire. Its course was not singular but entwined. Japan’s ability to develop a geography of protected places at home that was linked to national, regional, and global networks reveals that the conditions of informal empire in East Asia created a framework that would enable Japan to become a modern imperial power. Within this shared space of commercial networks, shipping routes, and the dominance of Western law, we find a malleable spatial grid that allowed for Japan’s international activities to increase as they began moving away from a small core of treaty ports to an extended number of coastal sites around the country before the enactment of the revised treaties in 1899.

Treaty Ports and Informal Imperialism

To understand the basic framework in which the special trading ports operated, a brief look at the conditions in East Asia during the late nineteenth century is warranted. The system of informal empire imposed upon Japan in 1858, first by the Americans and then in rapid succession by the British, Russians, Dutch, French, and others, is generally known as the treaty port system. Predicated on the tenets of free trade, the treaties in question aimed to secure foreign access to Japan’s resources and markets with minimal protectionist intervention by its government. Since Japanese rulers did not wish to open their country to Western trade at the time, the initiation and implementation of the treaties took place under the threat of military force. The modern warships anchored near the capital made visible the “gunboat diplomacy” that encouraged Japan’s acquiescence to the intruders’ demands. Retaining power to negotiate, however, the Japanese importantly managed to limit the scope of treaty privileges to specified port locations, collectively labeled treaty ports.

As the oft-used phrase “unequal treaty” makes plain, the terms of these agreements were nonreciprocal, establishing a pattern of relations based on the compromised sovereignty of one country. The new laws

11. I use the term semicolonony to mean that as a political entity, Japan did not have an “externally recognized right to exercise final authority over its affairs” (Biersteker and Weber, “Social Construction,” 1–2).
Introduction

specifically opened five Japanese ports to international trade while granting foreign signatories such rights as extraterritoriality, most favored nation clauses, and fixed tariff rates, thus codifying an order of economic and diplomatic imbalance in a single stroke. Japan would spend the next fifty years maneuvering to free itself from these constraints, even while partaking of its benefits, as it strived to be treated as an equal in the comity of nations.

Japan was not alone in suffering the indignity of unequal treaties. Constituting the leading eastward edge of the modern interstate system, informal empire spread across the Ottoman territories and into Southeast and Northeast Asia during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. The new relationships that came with this advance prescribed Western standards of territorial sovereignty, trade, and international law as well as an ideology of “civilization,” compelling non-Western states and their subjects to engage not only with foreign institutional practices related to trade and diplomacy but also with new concepts of citizenship and nationhood in a decidedly hierarchical world order based on military power, wealth, and a shroud of Western superiority. Led by British efforts to establish Palmerstonian free trade around the world, the non-reciprocal treaties of informal empire would be negotiated by midcentury with the Ottoman Turks, Burmese, Siamese, Chinese, and Japanese.

Taking the modern system of interstate relations beyond Europe and America meant that the terms of ingress had to be renegotiated with each state. In every encounter, both sides drew on a growing body of legal and experiential precedent that nonetheless resulted in unique variants each time bilateral treaties were signed. Western powerbrokers insisted on stipulations that had proven effective in prior cases while local diplomats urged accommodations for indigenous circumstances. Although

12. See Duus, “Japan’s Informal Empire,” xiv–xix; Gallagher and Robinson, “Imperialism of Free Trade,” 1–14. Additionally, Alan Knight contends that informal imperialism existed in Latin America even though it was not marked by unequal treaties (“Britain and Latin America”).
15. The Chinese, for instance, introduced the most favored nation clause in an attempt to guard against having any one nation gain undue power over their country.
such basic tools of informal empire as tariff restrictions and extraterritoriality were applied universally, the use of treaty ports was more limited.

The opening of select ports for trade and residence by Westerners in China and Japan, and then later by the Japanese in Korea, became the hallmark of informal empire in Northeast Asia. Here the Western advance breached long-standing restrictions confining foreign trade to designated ports. The treaty port system was rooted in this earlier pattern of geographically limited exchange while it expanded the existing port structures and networks first developed by local groups.

In China, Westerners had been allowed to trade at the southern port of Canton (now Guangzhou) since the 1750s. Nearly a century later, the British were pushing the boundaries of legal trade to increase their profits from the sale of opium. When met with determined Chinese resistance, Great Britain used military force to ensure their commercial interests in the First Opium War of 1839–42. As a result, China ceded Hong Kong and opened five ports (Shanghai, Ningpo [Ningbo], Foochow [Fuzhou], Amoy [Xiamen], and Canton) to foreign residence and trade in a succession of treaties with foreign powers starting with the 1842 Treaty of Nanking (Nanjing).

Whereas the Chinese initially succeeded in confining the foreigners to this handful of sites, they would steadily have to yield more ground, literally and figuratively, over the next half-century. After ratification of the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin (Tianjin), signed during the Second Opium War (1856–1860), the first treaty ports were joined by eleven more, for a total of sixteen, some along interior riverine routes. The restriction of foreigners to the treaty ports, as agreed to in China’s first set of treaties, meant that the transport and sale of merchandise beyond these sites

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Unfortunately, they did not foresee how it would be employed to multiply concessions against them (Fletcher, “Heyday of the Chi’ing Order,” 383).

16. Kasaba suggests that the Sublime Porte unsuccessfully tried to limit treaty privileges to specific ports in the 1840s (“Treaties and Friendships,” 222).

17. On the importance of local populations and longer-term perspectives on port development, see Broeze, “Introduction,” 4–9.

18. Jürgen Osterhammel states that Chinese historians counted 1,182 unequal agreements signed in that country alone by the end of the century, giving the treaty port system “an almost impenetrable complexity” (“Britain and China,” 153).
Introduction

depended on indigenous merchants and their networks. The second set of treaties, however, allowed trade, travel, and missionary activity in China’s interior, significantly increasing the level of foreign penetration into that country. By the early twentieth century, a series of lost battles led China to grant further territorial concessions and to open a staggering total of ninety-two treaty ports.

By contrast, Japan never had to concede to opening more ports beyond those agreed upon in the 1858 Ansei Treaties. The difference in the trajectories of the treaty port system in the two countries is striking. As the Japanese managed, through acuity, persistence, and luck, to keep Western encroachment in check, they began consolidating national boundaries and increasing their own presence on the continent by making effective use of the treaty port system’s complex, porous infrastructure and its evolving matrix of imperial relationships. Redefining ties with its neighbors was a first step toward building a competitive modern nation-state. Following the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese began incorporating Hokkaido (known as Ezo before 1869) and the Ryukyu Islands into the polity. The Meiji leaders signed a treaty with China in 1871 enabling the two countries to trade with each other on an equal basis until an increasingly antagonistic relationship led to war. The subsequent 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki gave Japan the same privileges as the Western powers in China as a most favored nation. Meanwhile, in 1876, the Japanese used their own version of gunboat diplomacy to open the first three treaty ports in Korea, which were followed by five more by century’s end. In 1899, on the eve of the treaty revision in Japan, Northeast Asia had fifty active treaty ports (see Map 2). After that pivotal date, revisions eliminated treaty ports in the archipelago even as Japan maintained privileged access to all of the others, thus ensuring a sharp

21. On differences between China and Japan, see, for example, Duus, Abacus and the Sword, 21; Moulder, Japan, China, and the Modern World Economy; and Osterhammel, “Semi-Colonialism,” 299–302.
22. On the porous nature of British control over its empire, see Benton, A Search for Sovereignty.
23. The degree to which Japan’s absorption of Hokkaido in 1869 and the Ryukyu Islands in 1879 constituted imperialism is an open debate. See, for example, Caprio, Japanese Assimilation, ch. 2; Morris-Suzuki, “Lines in the Snow”; Oguma, “Nihonjin” no kyōkai, chs. 1–3; Sawada, Okinawa to Ainu.
divergence in legal positions and economic privileges across the region at the start of the twentieth century.

**Special Trading Ports**

Although the treaty port system necessarily serves as the main frame of reference here, an assessment of Japan’s modern maritime networks needs to consider what the unequal treaties did not do. For our purposes, one thing in particular stands out: they did not forbid Japan from opening additional ports on its own. From the Western perspective, such a stipulation would not have been in the interests of the many foreign diplomats and merchants who repeatedly asserted that additional treaty ports should be named. On the Japanese side, although the government proceeded
with caution, politicians, prominent businessmen, and local citizens
eying their own economic gain tempered Tokyo’s reluctance with their
frequent calls for opening the country.24

The Meiji oligarchs responded to these calls by designating a score
of special trading ports, at different points in time, to aid in bringing in-
ternational trade revenues to hinterlands throughout Japan. Surprisingly,
these ports have largely gone unnoticed as a set of active international
ports, but they offer important new information about how Japan was
able to advance economically and militarily at the end of the nineteenth
century. It would, after all, only make sense that the Japanese people and
government would feel the limitations of five international trade ports,
especially ones dominated by foreigners, and would seek alternative ways
to ensure their commercial and military well-being. Although the treaty
port system purposefully favored Western merchants, it did not by any
means shut down native commercial networks or inhibit their evolution.
The special trading ports provided a way for Japan to minimize its vul-
nerability while maximizing its opportunities. Moreover, they became
places where Japanese merchants could use international trade and ship-
ing networks yet remain free of foreign competition in what amounted
to a kind of “reverse liberalization of trade.”25

By actively tapping into the larger matrix of informal empire, these
sites developed and extended their own tendrils of capitalist enterprise
and imperialistic advance into other parts of Asia. These sprouts grew
on the durable mesh that had been tightened by the dominant Western
(and Western-employed) diplomats, merchants, compradors, shippers, and
sailors in the region whose activities were reinforced by distant home gov-
ernments, militaries, and powerful financial interests. By the time Japan
regained its sovereignty at the end of the century, it had already woven
its own sturdy fibers into the warp and woof of East Asian transport and
exchange, allowing it to sustain an increasing, independent level of

24. Not everyone felt this way. For example, some foreign merchants feared
greater opening would detract from existing trade and dilute their efforts across
too many sites. See Hoare, Japan’s Treaty Ports, 139. As late as 1898, arguments
against the persistent idea that opening more ports would automatically take trade
from existing ports were still being made in Japan. See, for example, Ishii, Nihon no
kōwan, 38–42.

25. I am indebted to Steven J. Ericson for this formulation.
participation in the global economy. The special trading ports provided a mechanism for locales across Japan to directly join this spatial grid.

_Transmarine East Asia_

The principal geographical space considered here is transmarine East Asia.²⁶ This term is fairly straightforward, incorporating the seas and coastal zones of Northeast and Southeast Asia, and describing a shared site—one with “layered sovereignties”—where people from around the world interacted with one another.²⁷ More specifically, it designates the primary arena where the Japanese engaged with Western and Asian powers, established independent nodes of commerce, and launched military initiatives in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Whereas Japan’s diplomatic concerns within transmarine East Asia centered on China and Korea, its trade patterns followed Western, especially British, shipping networks, which cut a wider swath of commerce that reached treaty ports and colonized coasts from Bombay (Mumbai) and Rangoon (Yangon) to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. These networks, and Japan’s creation of new ones, had a global reach where Japan found important markets.

Using transmarine East Asia to designate a specific region of interaction incorporates four of Takeshi Hamashita’s “Maritime Zones of Asia.”²⁸ From north to south, then, transmarine East Asia covers the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, as well as the East China and South China Seas (see Map 3). This region covers both the treaty port system and the primary locations linked to the special trading ports. Under the mantle of formal and informal imperialisms that spanned this region in the nineteenth century, sites with varying degrees of territorial occupation and mixed shades of economic dependence coexisted in patchwork fashion.

Within this varied space, Japan’s relative freedom to pursue modernization was inexorably bound to its own international status. Even as Japan advanced its economy, it nonetheless faced an international society of

²⁶. Mimi Hall Yiengpruksawan uses the phrase “transmarine Northeast Asia” in _Hiraiizumi_, 17.
MAP 3 Transmarine East Asia.
states that viewed it as inferior. Through the unequal treaties, the Western powers delivered a vague but loaded charge for Japan to earn back its full sovereignty. Like China and other countries subjected to informal empire, Japan was pushed into a normative order prescribing that it modernize or be overtaken. Japan’s activities in the nineteenth century must be viewed in this environment. The Japanese desire to be recognized as a sovereign nation and revise the unequal treaties, which was a constant refrain at state and local levels throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, guided how the central government approached both modernization and the country’s infrastructural development.

Viewing Japan as a state seeking the rights and privileges of the world’s leading powers focuses attention on the international relationships that contextualized and contributed to Japanese decision making. Recent studies of imperialism that employ a more global perspective have been moving away from once-predominant linear models that view Japan as an anomaly, latecomer, or imitator, and end up placing the country temporally—and spatially—at odds with the Western powers as well as with its colonies. This historiographical turn instead allows us to see more clearly that Japanese imperialism developed in direct relation to other contemporaneous empires and the pressures, possibilities, and conventions accompanying them. In practice, all empires learn, borrow, and even rely on those that precede them or compete against them. Japan was no exception. In fact, Japan’s ability to make effective use of the Western presence in East Asia, especially through Western shipping and markets (which in turn relied on indigenous networks), is key to understanding Japan’s growing power during this era.

Once Japan signed an unequal treaty in Korea in 1876, the country began participating as an aggressor within East Asia’s structure of informal imperialism even while it remained subordinate to the Western

32. On newer trends in the field, see Caprio, Japanese Assimilation; Cassel, Grounds of Judgment; Dusinberre, “Janus and the Japanese Empire”; and Schmid, “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem.’ ”
33. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, esp. 2–7; Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History, 3; Kamen, Empire, xxiv–xxv; and Kramer, “Power and Connection,” 1350.
treaty powers. Two decades later, however, Japan’s victory over Qing China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 signified three important shifts in Japan’s bid to be recognized as a sovereign nation-state: an unprecedented change in East Asian power relations, the acquisition of new colonial territory, and a major step toward parity with the Western empires. The trade and transportation infrastructures established after decades of work at home proved to be a constituent part of these changes.

Although the special trading ports initially sprang from the need to establish trade in more locations across Japan, they came to support the country’s economic and military endeavors in ways unforeseen at their naming. By the turn of the twentieth century, it was clear that Japan’s international ports were central to the material functioning of Japan’s empire. The treaty ports and special trading ports embodied the layers of sovereignty and power at work in East Asia, and the perils and opportunities located therein, as they unequivocally shaped intra-Asian relationships. Japan’s rise as an expansive nation-state and the development of its port system must be understood in this context for the Japanese were acutely aware of the double-edged nature of the empires on their waterfront.

Connecting Japan at Multiple Spatial Scales

Examining the ways the treaty port system and the special trading ports functioned together reveals the multiplicity of connections that both challenged and empowered Japan as it joined the late nineteenth-century world order. Yet Japan’s emergence as a modern nation-state was not solely the result of high-level diplomacy and elite economic leadership for this process took place across multiple scales. The dismantling of the unequal treaties, the establishment of regional networks, and the creation of an infrastructure that would support an empire hinged on initiatives undertaken at the local level. Japan’s international ports functioned as spaces of activity where denizens established and maintained networks vital to their own well-being so that even as they operated within the broader set of imperial relationships underpinning all Asian port cities, they accommodated local, regional, and national ambitions.

As the most successful of the special trading ports, Moji exemplifies the sustained development of maritime networks that directly linked local sites to commercial and military operations spanning East Asia. Since
activities taking place in Moji often depended on key legislative decisions and recognition from Tokyo, this narrative must necessarily acknowledge the role of the central government. At the same time, focusing on Moji’s maritime and local histories allows us to decenter Tokyo as the prime creator of Japanese industrialization and commercial expansion.

Shifting the view away from Tokyo to focus on how the “local” interacted directly with the “global” also makes room for a discussion of how the people of Moji strategically positioned their port city to gain advantage, not merely within Japan, but in East Asia and beyond. As the people of Moji concerned themselves with domestic coal supplies, competing ports, and overseas markets, we can map how they defined their city in relation to these larger geographies. Moreover, since Moji functioned as a principal military depot and information hub during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, its newspaper reveals how the Japanese nation and its fledgling empire galvanized the city’s own identity.

The present study is structured to highlight the three dominant geographical scales of place-making in mid-nineteenth-century Japan: global, national, and local. The region of transmarine East Asia serves to help locate the global in space and serves as a consistent backdrop against which these scales shift. The intent is to create a nested history of Japan in three parts. Part I covers the large-scale, top-down processes that set the framework for Japan’s port systems under the consequential Ansei Treaties. Part II shows how ports like Moji were key to the modernization of the nation’s infrastructure and its military operations. Lastly, Part III hones in on the locally based actors who engaged these global and national forces in their home ports.

While this work crosses spatial scales, it proceeds in a generally chronological fashion. Chapter 1 delineates five distinct phases in the opening of the country, explaining how the treaty ports and special trading ports became Japan’s chief sites of foreign interchange. Chapter 2 examines the economic turmoil that resulted from opening the country to foreign exchange and the measures the Meiji oligarchs took to stabilize national finances. Central to this discussion is the way the nation’s leaders targeted rice and coal exports to ship overseas from an extended number of locations in order to facilitate the flow of revenues into Japan. In so doing, they unwittingly laid a foundation for the special ports of export (tokubetsu yushutsukō), which partly rested upon older patterns of domestic transportation and production.
Part II looks at the development of national infrastructures in relation to the special trading ports. Since ports formed the links between water- and land-based transportation routes, the third chapter examines harbor improvements, shipping lanes, and railroad networks together with news and markets, to consider how these elements came together in the creation of a thriving port. Chapter 4 moves beyond economic imperatives to look at Japan’s commercial and naval vulnerabilities. Close inspection of the special ports of export reveals the ways in which the Japanese used Western shipping networks and fleets in strategic ways to enhance their own commercial profiles. Additionally, incidents with foreigners at the ports highlight Japan’s limited control over the waterways immediately surrounding the archipelago.

Finally, Part III zooms in on the port of Moji to detail how its boosters, politicians, and businessmen created an identity for the port in relation to the nation-state and its rising empire. Chapter 5 examines the port’s functions during the Sino-Japanese War through the Moji shinpō’s reportage of the conflict. More broadly, the chapter asks how the war became part of people’s daily lives and contributed to the developing identity of this port city. The final chapter takes up the prolonged campaign to have Moji named an open port. Through nationwide collaboration and competition, the port finally secured its spot as a principal hub in transmarine East Asia. The enactment of the revised treaties in 1899 heralded the end of the treaty port system in Japan and the recovery of Japanese sovereignty. This moment also, however, signaled a new level of opening to international trade, a long-term transition that was eased considerably by the special trading ports. Now with the hard-won status of open ports, these locales remained core places of exchange where Japanese citizens engaged the world during peace and war well into the twentieth century.