INTRODUCTION

Hugo Frank’s prison was enclosed by a gray twenty-five-foot wall. The visitation, his brother Ludy wrote later, took place in a cell divided by a glass panel, with an opening on one end from which a guard could listen to both sides. Tables and chairs were pushed against either side of the glass. Ludy entered and sat.

On the other side of the glass stood the figure of a tall, bent man, his face covered by a cone-shaped straw hood. The guard commanded the prisoner to take off his hood. With a deep, cringing obeisance to the guard, the prisoner uncovered his face—it was my brother. Hair cropped, shoulders bent, cheeks sunken in, in his eyes a look of wild fright, the large eyes of an emaciated, hunted animal. He asked the guard whether he might speak to me, who nodded permission.

The conversation had to be in Japanese. “Ludy, thank you so much for coming all this way to see me; it is terribly nice of you. I am perfectly alright. Nothing is wrong with my body, it is in perfect condition, give me medicine, any kind of medicine, I am hungry, send food in please, I am so hungry, my body is perfectly alright, send me medicine!” While he was talking to me he bowed and pleaded, cast furtive glances at the warden listening in. I couldn’t talk at first. I felt as if my chest would burst.¹

So reads Ludy (Ludwig) Frank’s account of that visitation with his older brother in January 1945, written in a memoir a year later. Ludy had not been permitted to ask about the charges against Hugo nor
about Hugo’s treatment at the prison. No need to; his brother’s despera-
tion was plain enough. The signs of torture were obvious, and the
charge would be espionage, as it was for the other anti-Nazi Germans
being held.

This was Ludy’s first visit to Gumyōji Prison in Yokohama. His next
would be on February 14, 1945, the day before Hugo’s sentencing. On that
occasion Hugo was equally distraught. “I had the audacity of asking him
whether all the charges brought against him were true,” Ludy wrote. “The
guard interfered loudly, threatening to throw me out if I asked such a
question again. Nevertheless, I asked it again, upon which my brother
answers, ‘No—yes, yes, yes, it is all true, every word of it!’ This cost me
the interview, my last one with my brother, and a fine of 200 yen for
breaking prison regulations. The next day I saw him receiving his sen-
tence in the courthouse.”2 The sentence was five years for violation of the
National Defense Security Law (Koku bō hoan-hō). This was the last time
Ludy would see his brother alive.

The Frank brothers were among the thousands of Western civilians
stranded in Japan during the Asia-Pacific War. Hugo was one of over
one hundred arrested for suspicion of espionage, and Ludy was among
the roughly one thousand forced to evacuate coastal cities for safety in
the mountains.3 Japanese authorities interned about one thousand others
as enemy aliens.4 The existence of these expats remains largely unknown,
their stories neglected by the shelves of books on ideological and military
aspects of the war. The oversight is understandable, for as a mixture of na-
tionalities and ethnicities this diffuse cohort of business professionals,
missionaries, teachers, diplomats, and miscellaneous others shared no
common association or legacy other than residency in wartime Japan. As
such, there has been little political incentive to recover them. Their di-
versity of containment experiences also defies easy summation. From
the Japanese perspective, Germans and Italians were allies; Swiss and
French were neutral; Americans, British, and Dutch were enemy nation-
als; Jewish refugees, White Russians, and other stateless individuals
held a separate status; and diplomats and missionaries called for yet dif-
ferent treatment. Moreover, as Christina Twomey suggests, some Western
researchers have been disinclined to acknowledge this diverse assemblage
because its mere existence stirs vestiges of Western guilt over atrocities
committed in the name of colonial ambition in Asia. Consequently, these individuals remain collectively unclaimed by postwar researchers, and their omission from history has impoverished our knowledge of how Japanese authorities and citizens contended with “the other within.”

A dearth of historical materials also explains the virtual nonexistence of Anglophone scholarship on foreign civilians in wartime Japan. Records on domestic POW camps, evacuation communities, court hearings, and police surveillance were destroyed either in the air raids or by Japanese authorities following the surrender. An inert civil society and the virtual elimination of independent publishing, broadcasting, and photography have also left few documentary traces of this demographic. The unfortunate paucity of firsthand accounts is further explained by a pervasive reluctance to relive wartime hardships through writing. Many Japanese, Miyabara Yasuharu asserts, desired to forget those years of suffering. Consequently, much remains unknown. “People’s histories” like Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People, Samuel Hideo Yamashita’s Leaves from an Autumn of Emergencies: Selections from the Wartime Diaries of Ordinary Japanese, and Thomas R. H. Havens’s Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two offer great interest and historical value by recovering wartime experience through the voices of civilian Japanese, but omit the voices of foreign residents trapped in the country during those years, as well as Japanese testimonies about them.

For these reasons, the Western experience of wartime Japan currently enjoys no coherent narrative. Published accounts authored by interned individuals are rare; firsthand accounts of incarceration and torture are rarer. The Western experience survives mainly within private letters, journals, and testimonies given to Occupation forces. It is also transmitted through a disparate assortment of thinly contextualized memoirs, most self-published and written decades later, that recount their authors’ daily struggles with privation, air raids, and police harassment. Not only do these memoirs, many vivid and rich in detail, collectively resurrect daily life in wartime Japan, they illuminate “on the street” wartime race relations.
Within this diverse body of testimonies, race consciousness (as distinguished from racial hatred) emerges as a salient feature of human relations during Japan’s imperial era (1895–1945). For resident foreigners, certainly, race was the singular defining feature of life in Japan. Memoirs written during and immediately following the war best preserve the racial hostility typical of that era, though later works also reveal lingering prejudices. For some of these memoirists, life in wartime Japan was a simple script of heroes, traitors, and brutes. James Thomas, a civilian POW, characterizes Japan and its people as “a strange and ruthless enemy” and its view of the conflict as a “holy war to smite the lowly Caucasian infidels.” One cannot fault Thomas for finding his guards strange and ruthless, and he is correct that his captors likely found racial antipathy useful, as Thomas himself does, for explaining their nation’s military overtures. His view of “the Japanese” as crazed fanatics “with no respect for human life and an eagerness to die in Banzai charges for their Emperor” reflects the sort of visceral racial bitterness typical of these biographies. George Lavrov asserts that, “all gaijins [sic] . . . were generally viewed as enemy spies and collaborators. . . . Toward the end of the war, life in Japan deteriorated so much that people were literally starving, especially the gaijins.” His statements may pertain to Lavrov’s own family but are reductive and generally inaccurate. They encapsulate wartime life as an “us” versus “them” racial confrontation that assumes all Japanese shared a single mind and all resident foreigners suffered a singular wartime experience. And, whereas Japanese brutality was real, many authors attribute it to a racial predisposition rather than considering its historical context or its possible strategic and practical functions.

Nonetheless, the centrality of race in these narratives does accurately reflect a distinctly emotional dimension of the war for all involved. For the past three decades, John Dower’s pioneering and voluminous scholarship has grounded research on race relations in the Pacific. This book will repeatedly engage with and cite from Dower, for there is much to
learn from his writings. It also reworks some of Dower’s findings, but takes particular issue with how others have interpreted him. Of particular concern is the legacy of Dower’s scholarship on the mutual racial hatred permeating the Pacific War, his characterization of the conflict as a “race war” permeated by “race hate.”10 In the United States, Dower writes, war against Japan “stirred the deepest recesses of white supremacism and provoked a response bordering on the apocalyptic. . . . This was true of both sides. The Japanese were racist too—toward the white enemy and in conspicuously different ways toward the other Asians who fell within their ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere.’ ”11 Given that these assertions echo rhetoric issued by Japan’s wartime authorities, one can assume that the terms “Japan” and “the Japanese” refer to governmental and military elites, policy makers and journalists, academics and social theorists, and scientists and ideologues—those who tell the rest what to think and believe. They are not meant to include the Japanese public. What the public actually thought and believed has been omitted from the conversation, and largely omitted from consideration altogether. State propaganda and militarist ideologues spoke for the Japanese people during the war, and, in its omission of public opinion, postwar academic discourse has allowed them to continue doing so. Postwar Japanese themselves have also been content with the facile assumption that racial propaganda issued by a military autocracy accurately represented their own wartime relationships with local foreigners. This most certainly was not Dower’s intention, for he went on to publish a cogent study of wartime resistance, demonstrating that many Japanese were not duped by state ideology, racial or otherwise.12

Nonetheless, assumptions of fierce racial enmity have come to orient our understanding of both military and civilian wartime experience, and Dower’s work continues to inform an expanding body of scholarship that adds needed complexity to the notion of Japan and Anglo-America as symmetrical racialized regimes. Douglas Ford, for example, has argued that both sides instilled their militaries with hatred, fear, and paranoia about their enemy’s own racial objectives. Each side, the argument continues, understood the enemy to be carrying out a racial crusade in order to upset and even invert the world’s standing racial order. For each, the threat of being vanquished racially was even more personally and emotionally intolerable than that of being defeated militarily. Yet, Ford continues, racial hatred did not engender an enduring incentive to fight.
On the Japanese side, indoctrination was only partially successful in instilling Japanese troops with a “fighting spirit” that would endure throughout the conflict. In fact, enthusiasm faded. Many Japanese soldiers were reluctant to sacrifice themselves for the state and served in the military only out of legal obligation. Enthusiasm further waned as troops confronted hunger, disease, and the hardships of battle in foreign environments. And, from 1943, when the war’s momentum turned in favor of the Allies, more Japanese troops became less willing to submit to meaningless self-sacrifice. Focusing on how military officials conducted military planning of the war, Ford also concludes that U.S. strategy was shaped less by racial hatred than by a good, rational understanding of the enemy and its vulnerabilities.13

Gerald Horne has also described the prewar colonial world as a neurotic international pecking order that organized peoples as whites, yellows, and browns. Japan, he asserts, did not oppose the notion of ethnic taxonomies, which fit so neatly within the hierarchical nature of its own society. It opposed only its own relegation to a middling rank within that taxonomy. In a clear expression of pushback against the racial arrogance endemic to Western imperialism, Horne continues, Japan’s POW camps attempted to invert the standing racial order by formulating a system of POW treatments based on ethnic characteristics. It treated individuals bearing Caucasian features more harshly—generally interning them—than natives of conquered territories or those bearing Asian features.14 This agenda also explains the numerous stories of reverse discrimination toward African Americans in prewar Japan, and of Japanese prison camps giving black POWs preferential treatment over whites.15

Other researchers have issued qualified challenges to characterizations of the war’s combatants as parallel racialized regimes fueled by roughly congruent forms of racial hostility. Takashi Fujitani and Yukiko Koshiro have taken important steps in this direction. Fujitani takes issue with Dower for not fully rejecting essentialistic perceptions of the “national character” of “the Japanese,” including the totalizing cultural traits associated with them. He also rejects the dominant presumption that Japanese racist propaganda remained essentially unchanged throughout the war, namely that it continued to adhere to earlier narratives about racial purity and divinity. Later in the war, Fujitani shows, Japanese authorities retreated from such positions, recognizing them to be injurious to race
relations throughout the empire. Doing so became particularly necessary as the state conscripted large numbers of Koreans and Taiwanese into military service and deployed them alongside Japanese soldiers in integrated units.16

Like Dower, Fujitani finds parallels in the ways that Japan and the United States functioned as war regimes. Their treatment and mobilization of colonial soldiers (“soldiers of color”) illuminate congruencies in how both nations exploited race. But he also argues for a shift in wartime racism away from exclusionary or “vulgar” racism and toward a more inclusive or “polite” racism.17 Nazi rhetoric had sensitized the international community to racist ideology, making it wary of colonialist policies that could be equated with Nazism. Japan touted its own benevolence and sought to honor the principles of freedom and racial equality by co-opting Koreans and Taiwanese as Japanese nationals and publicizing the alleged autonomy of its colonies.18 In the United States, as early as 1942 the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee cautioned against allowing the conflict to become a Pan-Asian (racial) war and recommended defusing the racial prejudice so pervasive in the United States. While this advice did not erase the racist content of public propaganda, political authorities in both America and Britain grew more careful to avoid racial references in their public rhetoric.19 Such measures allowed both regimes to assume a moral high ground vis-à-vis the Nazi regime, which dealt with its racial outsiders with extermination rather than inclusion. Fujitani thus finds that denunciations of racism by the United States and Japan during the war resulted in an “uneasy compatibility of racism and its disavowal” in both regimes.20 “As powerful as the discourse on the pure Yamato race may have been in the minds of many within the elite (and outside it),” he writes, “the exigencies of war made it increasingly necessary to disavow racist discrimination and to demonstrate the sincerity of this denunciation through concrete policies.”21

Koshiro provides two more crucial corrections to our understanding of Japanese colonialism and wartime racial attitudes. First, since initiating imperialist overtures on the mainland during the Meiji period, Japan had viewed Russia as a competitor for territory and resources. Recognizing the advantages of mitigating those tensions, ideologues determined to identify Russians as Asian, not “white” (Western), and to include rather than exclude Russia from Japan’s Pan-Asian vision.22 This accord was
played up in the media as evidence that Japanese Pan-Asianism was morally superior to Nazi and American racism. The cooperation, and in some cases collaboration, between Russian residents and Japanese authorities lent credibility, complexity, and depth to Japan’s colonial designs. This would be especially visible in Manchukuo, where ideologues openly welcomed a spectrum of Russian émigrés with hopes that the coexistence of multiple Asian ethnicities would be enriched by residents without typically Asian features.23

Second, Koshiro continues, it is simplistic and thus inaccurate to call the Pacific War a race war between whites and yellows. Japan did not unilaterally identify Western nations as simply white, nor did it view citizens of those nations equally. Japanese harbored particular ire toward British and Americans, not toward Caucasians per se, and retaliated against what they perceived as a concerted Anglo-American cultural and racial attack on Japan. In spite of its various campaigns to erase American cultural and linguistic imports from public view, Japan did not abhor all forms of Western culture.24 Throughout the war era, the state continued to embrace select Western cultural forms that did not directly invoke the United States and Britain.

Fujitani and Koshiro have begun to dismantle the parallel racial regimes thesis by adding critical qualifications to views of the war’s combatants as xenophobic nations whose racisms remained static and uniform throughout the conflict. Testimonies from resident Westerners add a neglected dimension to this discourse, their varied accounts of wartime living conditions calling for further reconsideration of the conflict as a race war driven by race hate. Did civilian Japanese subscribe to exhortations about racial purity and spiritual supremacy as evidence of their own racial preeminence? Did they extend their reverence for Japan’s emperor to credence in their own moral superiority? Even if so, did they manifest such beliefs in their interactions with Westerners in the form of overt racial hostility? A preponderance of evidence indicates that whereas propaganda was variously effective in inciting nationalism and instilling fear, particularly among the young, in many cases it contradicted the life experiences of Japanese adults and was thus unsuccessful in infusing them with a hatred of Caucasians. It suggests, rather, that a clear ideological divide separated most civilians from their military and political leaders, whose rhetoric neither represented nor reflected the interests of the citi-
zenry at large. For much of the adult population, interactions with resident foreigners were guided by more practical concerns. And while it is true that neither Japan’s populace nor its intelligentsia mustered any meaningful resistance to the war, a fact that some interpret as evidence of near-universal support for the state’s wartime racial narratives, neither could they accept the war. Evidence demonstrates, rather, that race hate was generally limited to military and government elites (and perhaps not even to those) and reveals minimal racial abuse consistent with Beverly Daniel Tatum’s definition of racism as “a personal ideology based on racial prejudice.”

In June 1942, 7,448 non-Asian foreigners were residing in Japan, including 2,838 (38.1 percent) myriad neutral and enemy nationals, 2,728 (36.6 percent) Axis nationals (Germans and Italians), and 1,882 (25.3 percent) stateless. This contingent was numerically overshadowed by and shared little experiential common ground with other foreign demographics. The 17,277 Chinese residents, for example, were surveilled but otherwise left undisturbed. (As Japan’s ongoing war against the Chinese Nationalists was undeclared and thus unofficial, resident Chinese, who were not judged to pose any destabilizing influence in any case, could not be labeled as enemy nationals. As British resident Syd Duer described the status of Chinese, “Apparently, no war, no spies, no internment!”)

Westerners also received treatment that was fundamentally different from that received by the twenty thousand second-generation Japanese Americans (Nisei) living in Japan, most of whom had been sent to Japan to study. The Japanese government, which subscribed to the jus sanguinis principle of Japanese citizenship as a natural extension of Japanese descent, revoked Nisei’s U.S. citizenship but otherwise took no formal putative action against them. Officially recognized as Japanese citizens, some male Nisei were conscripted into the Imperial Army and forced to fight for Japan. At the same time, Nisei continued to be incriminated as former Americans. Many were watched and harassed by police. At work, at school, and within their local communities, they suffered ostracism and discrimination. Nor were they eligible for repatriation via exchange ship, for while the United States acknowledged their U.S. citizenship, it viewed
that citizenship as somehow marginal or unequal. Only whites were repatriated during the war.\textsuperscript{29}

The several thousand enemy nationals—mostly diplomats; business professionals who had dismissed their governments’ advisories to repatriate; and journalists, teachers, and missionaries who had been reluctant to abandon their professional responsibilities—were interned or repatriated at various intervals during the war, but their collective containment under the Interior Ministry’s civilian jurisdiction cannot be considered analogous to that of their 130,000 counterparts interned under military jurisdiction throughout Japan’s colonial territories in China and Southeast Asia. These two demographics were subjected to disparate handling policies that resulted in dramatically different treatments and mortality rates.\textsuperscript{30} Though a numerical minority, therefore, Japan’s Western residents experienced the war altogether differently than other foreign populations trapped under Japanese control. Their myriad nationalities and official standings also belie any possibility of collectivizing their experience.

\textit{Officially}, nationality was indeed the criterion used to define and categorize foreign civilians as allied, neutral, stateless, or enemy nationals. This cohort’s breadth of wartime experiences supersedes the narrow parameters of nationality, however. To the extent that Japanese rhetoric failed to distinguish between “the West” and whiteness, its apprehension of the war as a struggle against Western hegemony encouraged perceptions of the conflict as fundamentally racial in nature. Not only did characterizations of whiteness as a threat to the national polity fail to acknowledge Japan’s European allies, \textit{unofficially} (for the general public) it rendered skin color more incriminating than nationality, which for many Japanese was not readily discernible in any case. Focus on race thus illuminates the extent to which racial invectives came to inform unofficial attitudes. Westerners were rarely uncritically adored, but neither was the racial capital they had accrued since the 1850s easily erased or reversed. For a general public that understood and cared little for distinctions between Western nationalities, race was the singular marker of otherness, the singular determinant of how an individual was to be grouped. As an interpretive lens, therefore, skin color was a greater factor than nationality in determining the tenor of “on the street” interactions between Japanese and foreign civilians.
For these reasons, our attention falls on Western, predominantly Caucasian, experience. In this context the term “Caucasian” is deployed to align with how the term *haku jin* was used in wartime Japan: as a catch-all reference to “Caucasoid” North Americans, Europeans, and the various foreign nationals who appeared “whiter” than Japanese themselves. Haku jin was an imprecise amalgamation of nationality and race in the sense that it considered being fair skinned and carrying the right passport to be sufficient evidence of “whiteness.” An individual’s actual racial background was beside the point. In other words, my use of “Caucasian” includes not just Germans, Japan’s principal allies, and Caucasoid Anglo-Americans, its principal antagonists, but also, from Jews to Greeks to Russians, fairer-skinned foreigners generally. Accounts of treatment extended to African Americans visiting Japan are scarce and conflicting, and the scarcity of dark-skinned nationals of “white nations” in Japan at this time precluded the term *haku jin* from any sense of inadequacy.

From the perspective of Japanese authorities, coexistence with resident Asians, whether resident Chinese or colonial subjects like Koreans and Taiwanese, represented an altogether different set of challenges and called for different strategic measures than did coexistence with Westerners. Not only did imperial Japan’s professed agenda of returning Asia to Asians require this double standard, Asian immigrants were too numerous to evacuate and their labor too precious to lose. The altogether separate standing of Westerners and Asians thus precludes any easy expansion of our project to include both groups or any possibility of discussing a singular, integrated “foreign experience” in wartime Japan.

Beyond nationality and race, in some contexts gender also factored into Japan’s handling of resident Westerners. The Interior Ministry’s initial containment protocols for enemy nationals called for the immediate internment of adult men but not women, though subsequent amendments to those directives culminated in the eventual arrests of most American and British women. Some accounts suggest that Japanese police also considered women less threatening. Van Waterford claims that some camp guards were unsure how to treat female inmates and treated them more leniently as a result. And, when Iva Toguri (1916–2006, aka Tokyo Rose), a Japanese American, asked to be interned with the other American citizens, police denied her request in part because she was a woman. We also find evidence to the contrary. Some Japanese police and camp guards
took offense at the uninhibited speech and behavior of Western women, and the torture inflicted on espionage suspect Margaret Liebeskind (1908–2009) was more perversive than that exacted on male suspects being interrogated for similar crimes. Gender bias may also have factored into the treatment of eighteen Australian nurses captured in Rabaul, Papua New Guinea, and transferred to an internment camp in Kanagawa. Mysteriously, after December 1942 the prisoners were denied visitations from the International Red Cross and their existence was not acknowledged by Japanese authorities until June 1945.

This study will not engage with long-standing historiographical discussions over the nature of Japanese “fascism.” It will not deliberate on whether Japan’s militarist turn in the 1930s is best understood as the predestined result of feudal structures undermining the state’s efforts to modernize, or as a deviation from the nation’s otherwise glorious process of modernization. Nor will it provide a comprehensive discussion of Japan’s military activities, wartime politics, or imperial state (tennōsei) ideology. All such matters are well studied. Rather, it seeks to overturn facile myths about “the Japanese” by illuminating sharp contrasts between civilian and military experience. The project uses the living conditions and experiences of resident Westerners to reconsider the Pacific War as a race war and Japan as a nation permeated by race hate. Through this lens its seeks evidence of racial profiling and compares official containment policies with the range of handling practices actually administered by Japanese authorities and attitudes exhibited by the general public. This perspective will enable us to determine the existence of systemic racism (racist structures) in Japanese society, and the extent to which wartime authorities observed or violated international law in their handling of civilian internees. We will be taking special note of instances of race hate and race ambivalence, data that will help illuminate congruencies in racial attitudes between authorities and the public, and the extent to which racist ideology was put into practice.

The book’s two overarching objectives, therefore, are to recover and chronicle the diversity of Western experiences in wartime Japan, and to use that body of experiences to reconsider race relations. Though internment of enemy nationals will be the subject of chapters 7 and 8, this study’s investigation of Western civilians focuses on that cohort’s breadth of wartime activities rather than the internment experience exclusively. More-
over, its focus on civilians neither denies nor apologizes for Japan’s wartime brutalization of POWs, Chinese and Korean soldiers and laborers, comfort women (*ianfu*), and countless indigenous civilians throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, its focus on racial ambivalence among the Japanese public helps to contextualize and affirm the brutality and racial arrogance endemic to Japan’s military.

The study’s centerpiece will be the Frank and Balk families, German “Jews” who immigrated to Japan seeking opportunity and adventure. (Louis Frank [1886–1973] was Jewish but his wife, Amy [1884–1979], was Anglican; Estelle Balk [ca. 1898–1966] was Jewish but her husband, Arvid [1889–1955], was not.) Aside from their nationalities and mixed Jewishness, the two families shared little. The Franks were long-term residents of Japan, whereas the Balks arrived in 1934; Louis Frank was a celebrated educator and considered a national asset, whereas Arvid Balk was a freelance journalist, a profession that, though respected, incurred state suspicion; and during the war, most of the Franks evacuated to Karuizawa while the Balks evacuated to Gora, Hakone. Their children met and married, and under various wartime circumstances endured police harassment, suspicion, relocation, starvation, denaturalization, internment, and torture, as well as extraordinary acts of charity. Although this extended family’s disparate backgrounds are indicative of the multiplicity characterizing the greater Western community, its wartime experiences are noteworthy in two important respects. As mixed German Jews, their ethnic pedigree invites examination of Japan’s political and racial engagement with Nazi anti-Semitism, that is, how Japan as an Axis power handled resident nonparty Germans and Jews. Second, the arrests of Hugo Frank and Arvid Balk in the summer of 1944 on suspicion of espionage afford rare insight into how Japanese authorities treated and prosecuted foreign suspects. The Franks and Balks will also serve to contextualize a broader mosaic of stories from dozens of other families and individuals stranded in Japan. This montage of experiences covers pre-war life and wartime containment; extends from Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kobe to the mountain resorts of Karuizawa and Hakone; and invites extended discussion of the four general types of detention faced by Western civilians: temporary internment or house arrest prior to repatriation; evacuation; long-term internment; and arrest for suspicion of war-related crimes like espionage.
The first chapter discusses the reciprocal and bifurcated nature of Japanese race consciousness and how it shaped relations with resident Westerners throughout the imperial era. It then contextualizes our topic by reviewing how this “race war” has been analyzed by recent scholarship. Chapter 2 examines the formation of Western communities in Japan with particular focus on the insularity that was, by mutual agreement, sustained throughout the prewar period. It interprets this mutual insularity as a defensive reaction against perceived threats to national identity. The next chapter analyzes spiritual mobilization, policy making, and other strategies for containing Westerners. It uses the mixture of intolerance and leniency extended to Kobe’s Jewish community and Japan’s crackdown on Christianity as case studies to illustrate the situationism informing Japanese policy making. Chapter 4 begins a three-chapter discussion of the lives of nonenemy civilians during the war by investigating the destabilizing effects of the Pearl Harbor attack on the solidarity of Western communities. This is followed, in chapter 5, with discussion of the daily lives of Westerners in Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kobe following Pearl Harbor. In particular, it investigates the enemy diplomats and journalists who were apprehended and held until their repatriation via exchange ship. Chapter 6 details the evacuation order issued to urban areas in 1943 and the subsequent exodus of noninterned Westerners to several mountain resorts. Chapters 7 and 8 discuss wartime Japan’s treatment of enemy civilians. The former focuses on civilian internment camps, particularly those in the Kanto region, and considers whether Japanese authorities made adequate attempts to observe international law in their treatment of civilian prisoners. The latter highlights the misfortunes of Hugo Frank and Arvid Balk, both of whom were arrested for suspicion of espionage in July 1944 and then tortured, tried, and imprisoned for the remainder of the war. The final chapter returns to the question of race, finding stark contrasts in racial attitudes between elites and the Japanese public at large.

Widespread ambivalence toward whites, along with the extreme rarity of one-on-one “on the street” racism against them, indicates that Japanese authorities failed to imbue many Japanese with anti-Caucasian sentiment. It suggests, rather, that the diversity of resident Westerners necessitated a diversity of official containment strategies and elicited an equally diffuse range of reactions from the Japanese public. The book pos-
its that few Japanese ever internalized racial hatred for Westerners or placed much stock in racialized characterizations of the conflict; that public attitudes hinged more on practical concerns than ideological platitudes; and that amid the dehumanizing hardships of war, race consciousness was replaced by a survival consciousness that ultimately brought people together. As such, the book’s excavation of Western experiences inside wartime Japan advances a complexity that corrects essentializing assertions about Japanese race consciousness.
PART I

Caucasians and Race in Imperial Japan
Narratives about racial hatred in the Pacific War are predicated on the assumption that propaganda issued by the various combatants was effective in fostering roughly analogous forms of racial hostility. Given the inseparability of war and hatred generally, fighting between disparate ethnicities can be predicted to foment racial prejudices. In the context of the Pacific War, therefore, one would be surprised if widespread racial enmity did not crystalize between Japan and the Allied powers, as well as between their respective citizenries.

Such narratives also support positions that underscore the ruptures wrought by war—in this case the presumption that existing (prewar) race relations at the grassroots level collapsed under mounting ethnocentrism and xenophobia. Challenging the theory that resident Westerners suffered worsening treatment and a marked decline in socioeconomic prestige during the war—that changes in race relations outweighed continuities—calls for extended discussion of how resident Westerners lived and interacted with Japanese during the prewar years. The three chapters that follow provide this context along with analysis of the various changing landscapes occupied by Westerners during Japan’s imperial era. They explore prewar Japan’s epistemological backdrop, including Japanese race consciousness (as distinguished from racism per se) and its concomitant inconsistencies. They also consider the generally amicable but exclusionary race relations that formed in the mid-nineteenth century and that were preserved by mutual agreement and to mutual benefit throughout

Part I Introduction
In the 1930s, Japan’s defiant withdrawal from the League of Nations and incursions into the Asian mainland punctuated a tightening ideological landscape that would create increasingly austere domestic conditions, including legislation aimed at containing Westerners and their activities. Part I engages with these developments through a broad set of case studies—individuals, families, organizations, and communities—with a view toward contextualizing and then assessing the continuities and changes that wartime experience brought to domestic race relations.